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A major aim in evolutionary biology is to understand altruistic help and
reproductive partitioning in cooperative societies, where subordinate helpers
forego reproduction to rear dominant breeders’ offspring. Traditional
models of cooperation in these societies typically make a key assumption:
that the only alternative to staying and helping is solitary breeding, an
often unfeasible task. Using large-scale field experiments on paper wasps
(Polistes dominula), we show that individuals have high-quality alternative
nesting options available that offer fitness payoffs just as high as their
actual chosen options, far exceeding payoffs from solitary breeding. Further-
more, joiners could not easily be replaced if they were removed
experimentally, suggesting that it may be costly for dominants to reject
them. Our results have implications for expected payoff distributions for
cooperating individuals, and suggest that biological market theory, which
incorporates partner choice and competition for partners, is necessary to
understand helping behaviour in societies like that of P. dominula. Tra-
ditional models are likely to overestimate the incentive to stay and help,
and therefore the amount of help provided, and may underestimate the
size of reproductive concession required to retain subordinates. These find-
ings are relevant for a wide range of cooperative breeders where there is
dispersal between social groups.1. Introduction
Altruistic helping behaviour occurs throughout the animal kingdom despite
costs to helpers’ direct fitness. In cooperatively breeding animals, subordinates
care for, defend and provision the offspring of dominant breeders, while fore-
going or delaying their own reproduction [1,2]. A range of factors has been
identified to explain the evolution and maintenance of this phenomenon,
including both direct fitness benefits, such as inheritance of the breeding pos-
ition [3,4], and indirect fitness benefits obtained through helping a relative
[5,6]. However, there is an increasing awareness in the literature of the limit-
ations of traditional theoretical models, and a call for more complex models
that more realistically describe the social environment of individuals [7–12].
Specifically, traditional models predicting the level of help and reproductive
skew in cooperative breeders often make a key assumption: that a subordinate
helper’s only alternative to staying and helping in its current group is to leave
and breed solitarily [13–18]. However, breeding alone is often unfeasible or
highly risky [3,19,20], leading to the prediction that subordinates should
accept a high workload and a small share or zero part of the reproduction, in
order to remain in the group.
Recent literature increasingly suggests that in order to correctly estimate the
costs and benefits associated with staying and helping in a group, one must
compare the payoffs of that decision with an individual’s true alternative
options [7,8,11,21]. In reality, a subordinate’s alternative options may include
switching to another group or recruiting other cooperative partners to initiate
a new breeding group [11,20,22,23]. If such alternative options could lead to
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2higher fitness payoffs than solitary breeding, payoff distri-
butions may have been miscalculated in past studies,
overestimating the incentive for subordinates to stay and
help. Hence, future studies are encouraged to include the fol-
lowing: partner choice rather than partner control, where
sanctioning of uncooperative partners is replaced by partner
switching [12,23–25]; outside options beyond solitary breed-
ing [9,10]; asymmetric relationships where the exchange
of behaviours is more valuable for one of the parties
[21,26,27]; and n-player interactions not achievable in
traditional 2-player cooperative games [21,28]. These modifi-
cations can be achieved by invoking biological market
models [21]. Biological market theory predicts that compe-
tition for cooperative partners will affect the value of
commodities exchanged between individuals of different
trader classes [9,10]. In cooperative breeders, subordinates
may be seen as effectively exchanging helping behaviour
for group membership [15,29,30], and the value of helping
behaviour may therefore be affected by the supply of
and demand for help in the market. Subordinates may
be described as ‘paying to stay’ [30–32] or dominants as
‘paying for help’ [33,34], depending on which commodity
is in focus. For example, when there is competition among
dominants for a limited supply of helpers so that help is in
high demand, dominants may be willing to accept subordi-
nates paying less for group membership through reducing
their work efforts. Similarly, dominants might be willing to
pay more for help by granting a higher share of reproduction
to subordinates [9,10,22,33,34].
Several studies of cooperatively breeding mammals
[31,33,34], fishes [32,35,36], birds [30,37,38] and insects [22]
have found support for the concept that dominants and sub-
ordinates exchange commodities as described above. In the
cooperatively breeding paper wasp, Polistes dominula, we pre-
viously reported data consistent with the hypothesis that
dominants have to accept a lower payment from their subor-
dinates when competition for help is increased in the
population [22]. We first showed that wasps had outside
options and a choice of cooperative partners. We then exper-
imentally increased the amount of outside options available
to subordinates and found that subordinates, as a result,
decreased their work efforts [22]. These results suggest that
there is a biological market in this species where the supply
of outside options affects the exchange of cooperative beha-
viours within groups. However, in order to wholly
understand the dynamics between dominants and subordi-
nates, we need to know not only the number of alternative
options available but also their quality. Only by evaluating
the attractiveness of outside options will the behavioural
decisions of cooperative partners be clear. Here, we quantify
the outside options available to P. dominula wasps and esti-
mate the fitness payoffs associated with these options. We
further evaluate how partner choice may affect the payoff dis-
tribution between cooperative partners, and assess the
implications this may have for cooperative theory.
The nesting behaviour and social organization of
P. dominula is well studied, and our study sites offer large
samples of small groups [8,22,39]. At these sites, thousands
of mated females from the same generation emerge simul-
taneously from hibernation in early spring and found
hundreds of nests along cactus hedges (Opuntia ficus-indica).
Groups of typically fewer than 10 females and small numbers
(approx. 6.4% of all females in [40]) of solitary breeders rearworkers that mature during late spring and early summer.
Here we focus on the pre-worker stage where groups of simi-
lar-aged females live as cooperative breeders. The dominant
breeder lays all or most of the eggs, while subordinates build
and expand the nest, forage and help care for the offspring of
the dominant [41]. Nest residents often consist of genetically
related individuals (sisters and cousins), but a significant pro-
portion of subordinates are unrelated to the dominant they are
helping [42–44]. The chance of inheriting the breedingposition
or obtaining a small share of the reproduction has been used to
explain the presence of unrelated helpers in this species: Lead-
beater et al. [3] found that the amount of direct fitness obtained
as a subordinatewasgreater than through solitarybreeding [3].
However, if helpers have alternative options available that
offer higher fitness payoffs than solitary breeding, the incentive
to stay and help in their current groups may previously have
been overestimated.
We ask the following questions. (i) Do available nesting
options include high-payoff alternatives? Alternative options
will affect the predictions of existing models only if they offer
a higher payoff than solitary nesting. (ii) Do alternative
options differ from observed choices in ways that should
affect direct and indirect fitness, such as inheritance rank
and relatedness to the dominant? We predict that alternative
options are inferior to observed choices: in a biological
market, individuals are expected to assess their options and
make the choice that offers the highest payoff [10]. (iii) Is it
costly for dominants to reject an additional cooperative part-
ner? We expect help to be in high demand because
productivity and group survival increase with the number
of helpers in P. dominula [3,22], so we predict that rejecting
a joiner represents a cost to dominant breeders.2. Methods
(a) Study species, field site and handling of animals
Polistes dominula is a primitively eusocial (cooperatively-breeding)
wasp lacking morphological castes. At our field site, females
from the same generation found nests in early spring after over-
wintering. The first female offspring to mature in late spring
become workers and those maturing during summer mate and
overwinter, to restart the cycle next spring [3].
Experiments were carried out in a rural area in southern
Spain, close to Conil de la Frontera, Cadiz (N 36817010.900
W 6803057.800) [3,22] during two field seasons: March–May 2013
and 2014. We tagged and numbered a total of approximately
700 nests: approximately 475 nests in two sub-populations in
2013 and approximately 225 nests in one subpopulation in
2014 (figure 1; same data as used for ‘the partner choice exper-
iment’ in [22]). We further recorded the location of all nests
along three axes (to nearest 5 cm), allowing us to calculate the
distances between nests in a 3D space.
Combining the two field seasons, individuals from approxi-
mately 200 of these nests were collected during early mornings,
before sunrise (6.00–7.00). In the laboratory we gave each wasp
a unique code of four coloured dots on her thorax using
enamel paints; measured the length of one of her wings to the
nearest 0.1 mm; and obtained a DNA sample by cutting
the tarsus fromamiddle leg.Tarsussampleswerekept in100%etha-
nol at approximately 48C until used for genotyping. Wasps were
released close to their nests the same morning before 11.00. When
wasps were permanently removed as a part of an experimental
treatment they were either freeze-killed or released at a field
site 2.5 km away: none returned to her original site.
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Figure 1. Map of all nests in the three sub-populations used during two
different field season in 2013 (left hand and middle sections) and 2014
(right hand section). Cactus hedges are indicated in green and nests as
white Xs. Second-choice joiners’ first nest choices are indicated in yellow
and their second choices in red, with an arrow connecting the two.
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3(b) Experimental set-up
The day after residents were marked on a nest, we checked the
nest in the evening for additional, unmarked residents. Any
unmarked residents were collected the following morning and
marked as described above. Once all nest residents were
marked, we started daytime and evening censuses. Daytime cen-
suses consisted of 3–4 spot-checks per day (min. 30 min between
each census) on sunny days every 2–4 days, where the presence
or absence of nest residents were recorded during the main fora-
ging period (11.00–17.00). From the daytime censuses we
identified the social rank of each resident in the linear dominance
hierarchy: the dominant breeder spends the most time on the
nest, while the lowest-ranked individual spends the most time
away from the nest foraging [45].
In the evenings, nest residents return to their nests for the
night. During evening censuses (18.00–20.00), performed every
2–4 days, we searched focal nests for new joiners. To mark a
new joiner with minimal disturbance, we carefully applied a
single pink paint dot to its abdomen while it was on the nest
(day 0 of the joiner experiment). We videoed a subset of 21
focal nests on day 1 for three hours during the main foraging
period (11.00–17.00). The following morning (day 2), we
caught and marked the joiner as described above. On day 3 we
confirmed the presence of the joiner during an evening census,
so that we could plan to apply treatment the following morning
(day 4; treatment morning). If the joiner was not present on its
nest during one of these checks, we looked for it on the nest
for a maximum of three days. If the joiner re-appeared within
this period we continued with the next step of the procedure; if
it did not we resumed normal censuses of the nest.
On the morning of treatment in the joiner experiment, we
applied one of three treatments (n treated focal nests ¼ 62).
(1) Joiner’s first choice: this was our control treatment where thejoiner was allowed to stay and no nest residents were removed.
(2) Joiner’s second choice: we removed the joiner’s first nest
choice by permanently removing the nest and all of its residents,
while immediately releasing the joiner itself. If any established
residents were absent from the nest, we left the nest in situ for
a maximum of 48 hours before removing it, allowing us to attract
and remove remaining residents. (3) Joiner removal: we perma-
nently removed the joiner (or both joiners if two had joined)
while releasing all other residents near to the nest.
In addition to applying one of the three described treatments,
we also recorded the presence of all residents on focal nests by
collecting all wasps on their nest, recording their IDs and releas-
ing individuals immediately according to treatment. We further
performed a brood census on each focal nest, which included
counting the number of cells and categorizing the development
of brood within each cell. Nest-level brood values were later
summed as follows: small larva (given a value of 1.5), medium
larva (2), large larva (3) and pupa (4); a cell without a larva or
pupa was assumed to contain an egg (1).
In addition to the joiner experiment, we carried out a subor-
dinate experiment similar to treatment 2 ( joiner’s second choice),
but using established low-ranking subordinates, rather than new
joiners, from a separate set of nests. In each of 34 nests that had
not received joiners during our observations, we chose one of the
lowest ranking subordinates and released it after removing the
nest and the remaining nest residents, as in the joiner experiment,
treatment 2.
Following the treatments, we searched for released joiners
and subordinates in all nests in the sub-populations during day-
time and evening censuses every 2–4 days. When a released
individual was found on a new host nest with unmarked resi-
dents, we waited 2–3 days and then collected and marked the
residents. We also resumed daytime censuses on all focal nests
(including these new host nests) 2–3 days after treatment, and
performed brood census as described above every 10–15 days.
When the first worker(s) matured on a nest, we performed one
final brood census, and then discontinued all censuses on that nest.(c) Video analysis
Each video was watched by one of seven people who recorded
when nest residents left and returned to the nest, and all behav-
ioural interactions. Observers were all trained by one person,
who spot-checked for consistency. Behavioural interactions were
ranked according to level of aggressiveness: antennation (given a
value of 1), food sharing (2), and aggression (3; including all
more aggressive encounters such as bite, chew and lunge).
Two aggression values were calculated for each individual: the
sum of values for all behaviours initiated by that individual, and
the sum of values for all received behaviours during the full
video recording.
Foraging returns brought back to the nest were ranked
according to value in the following way: nothing visible (given
a value of 0), nesting material (1), liquid food, as evidenced by
trophallaxing (2), or a solid food ball (3). Foraging return
values were calculated for each individual as the sum of values
during the full video recording.(d) Genotyping and relatedness
Protocols were identical to those described previously [22].
Briefly, DNA was extracted from tarsus samples and samples
were genotyped at nine microsatellite loci used previously in
studies of the same population [3,22,44,46,47]. Each locus had
between 6 and 51 different alleles in our samples (median in
2013 ¼ 13; median in 2014 ¼ 11). All loci were amplified in a
single multiplex reaction using the Qiagen multiplex PCR kit
(Qiagen, Venlo, The Netherlands).
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Figure 2. Joiners in their first and second nest choices. Rank obtained by joiners (a) and the number of sisters (b) in their first-choice (blue) and second-choice nests
(red); points have been slightly jittered along the x-axis. Grey lines indicate the parameter space boundaries: if dots lie on the horizontal lines, a joiner had become
the dominant breeder (i.e. rank 1) (a) or had zero sisters in its nest (b); if dots lie on the steep lines, joiners had become the lowest-ranked subordinates (a) or had
only sisters in the group (b). Stippled lines indicate simple regression lines for first-choice (blue) and second-choice (red) joiners. Differences between first- and
second-choice joiners were non-significant (rank: p ¼ 0.80; number of sisters: p ¼ 0.97).
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
Proc.R.Soc.B
284:20170904
4RELATEDNESS v. 5.0.8 software [48] was used to calculate related-
ness between joiners and nest residents as in [22]. The Full Sibship
Reconstruction procedure in KINGROUP v. 2 software [44,49] was
used to identify groups of sisters among the nests in each block
(primary hypothesis: haplodiploid sisters; null hypothesis: haplo-
diploid cousins) [3]. We then counted the number of sisters each
resident had in its own nest and in other nests. Only individuals
with at least six out of nine loci scored successfully were used
(median number of successful loci per sample¼ 9); 1996 out of
2011 wasps were successfully genotyped.
(e) Statistics
All statistical analyses were performed using the statistical soft-
ware R [50]. Whenever appropriate, non-parametric tests were
used, and whenever the effect of more than one predictor was
tested, GLMs (generalized linear models) or GLMMs (general-
ized linear mixed models) were used [51]. For count data we
used Poisson error and tested for overdispersion: negative bino-
mial error was used if models were overdispersed, and again we
tested to ensure these models were no longer overdispersed
before proceeding. For models with continuous data we used a
Gaussian error structure and checked to ensure that residuals
were homogeneous and normally distributed. Non-significant
predictor variables ( p. 0.05) were removed from full models
in order to obtain more reliable p-values for the remaining pre-
dictors. When analysing data from video recordings, we
incorporated nest ID and the ID of the person watching the
video as random effects. When analysing aggression and fora-
ging return values we used the glmmADMB package [52] to
build GLMMs with negative binomial error. This package further
allowed us to account for zero inflation in the aggression models.3. Results
(a) Joiners’ alternative options
We permanently removed the first nest choices of 32 joiners
and recovered 25 (78.1%) of them on their second nesting
choices. Of these 25 second-choice joiners, 18 joined other
established nests, three initiated new nests with other
females, three joined nests of unknown ages, and only a
single joiner definitely initiated a new nest alone.Out of 21 second-choice joiners with known fates, six
(28.6%) became the dominant breeder on their second-
choice nest after joining or initiating it; the remaining 15
(71.4%) became subordinates. A first-choice joiner became
the dominant breeder on 2 out of 14 control nests (14.3%)
after joining. Thus, more joiners tended to become dominant
through their second nest choice than through their first,
although this difference was not significant (x2 with Yates’s
correction ¼ 0.33, d.f. ¼ 1, p ¼ 0.57).
Joiners’ second choices were similar to their first choices
in terms of other factors expected to affect fitness payoffs.
Firstly, there was no difference between first- and second-
choice joiners in the social rank they obtained after joining,
correcting for group size (figure 2a; GLM, Poisson error;
y ¼ social rank after treatment; main effects: treatment: z ¼
0.26, p ¼ 0.80, group size: z ¼ 3.32, p, 0.001, interaction
between treatment and group size: z¼ 0.95, p¼ 0.34, n¼ 36).
Secondly, there was no difference between first- and
second-choice joiners in terms of the joiners’ genetic related-
ness to the dominant in the group they joined (comparing
first- and second-choice joiners after treatment: Mann–
Whitney U test: W ¼ 73, p ¼ 0.64, n ¼ 26; comparing
second-choice joiners’ first and second nest choices: Wilcoxon
paired, V ¼ 19, p ¼ 0.95, n pairs ¼ 8), or in the number of
sisters they had in the group, correcting for group size
(figure 2b; GLM, negative binomial error; y ¼ number of
sisters after treatment; main effects: first- versus second-
choice joiners: z ¼ 0.038, p ¼ 0.97; group size: z ¼ 3.31, p,
0.001; interaction between treatment and group size:
z ¼ 21.41, p ¼ 0.16, n ¼ 40; y ¼ number of sisters of
second-choice joiners; main effects: first versus second
choice: z ¼ 20.97, p ¼ 0.33; group size: z ¼ 3.68, p, 0.001;
interaction between choice and group size: z ¼ 0.09, p ¼
0.93, n ¼ 22). Thirdly, there was no difference between first-
choice joiners, second-choice joiners and established nest resi-
dents in whether they stayed in their groups until worker
maturation or had disappeared by this stage (x2 ¼ 1.42,
d.f. ¼ 2, p ¼ 0.49; first-choice joiners: 14 out of 20 (70.0%);
second-choice joiners: 12 out of 23 (52.2%); established nest
residents: 84 out of 141 (59.6%) stayed till worker maturation).
01
2
3
4
5
n
o
.e
x
tr
a 
joi
ne
rs
first
choice
joiner
removal
first
choice
joiner
removal
n.s.
0
1
2
3
4
5
n
o
.t
ot
al
 jo
ine
rs
*
(b)(a)
Figure 3. The number of joiners received in first-choice (control) nests and in
joiner-removal nests. (a) The number of extra joiners that arrived after treatment
(p ¼ 0.37). (b) The total number of joiners received, including the treatment-
joiners in control nests but excluding them in joiner-removal nests (p ¼ 0.014).
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5New nests of second-choice joiners were mainly located
within a couple of metres of first nest choices (figure 1;
median ¼ 1.21 m, mean ¼ 1.93 m, max. ¼ 8.9 m). Seven out
of 22 (31.8%) second-choice joiners chose the closest nest (of
which five were established nests and two were newly
initiated). It was relatively common for wasps to visit other
nests in the population. We spotted 194 of the 1603 marked
wasps in the population (12.1%) on at least two different
nests. Wasps visited nests that were located up to 54.6 m
away from their original nests, but more than 95% of them
visited within a 5 m radius (median distance ¼ 0.9 m; mean
distance ¼ 2.2 m).
(b) Consequences of rejecting a joiner for established
nest residents
We removed one or two joiners from each of 16 joiner-
removal nests (21 joiners removed). After treatment, more
joiner-removal nests received extra joiners (7 out of 16
nests: 43.8%) than did control nests where joiners were
allowed to stay (2 out of 14 nests: 14.3%). However, the
difference in number of extra joiners received in the two treat-
ments was not significant (figure 3a; Mann–Whitney U test:
W ¼ 91.5, p ¼ 0.37, n ¼ 30), and the extra joiners received
were not enough to replace those removed: control nests
received significantly more joiners overall (including focal
joiners) than joiner-removal nests did excluding removed
focal joiners (figure 3b; Mann–Whitney U test: W ¼ 169,
p ¼ 0.014, n ¼ 30).
Original dominants were no more likely to lose their
dominant breeding positions in control nests where joiners
were allowed to stay than in joiner-removal nests. After treat-
ment, the dominant lost her breeding position in 4 out of 13
(30.8%) control nests and in 4 out of 15 (26.7%) joiner-removal
nests (x2 with Yates’s correction ¼ 0, d.f. ¼ 1, p ¼ 1).
Additionally, established nest residents were no more likely
to leave their nests after a joining event in control compared
to joiner-removal nests (Mann–Whitney U test: W ¼ 116.5,
p ¼ 0.86, n nests ¼ 30).Nest success, measured as date of worker maturation and
as brood development at worker maturation, was not affected
by treatment or by a switch in the dominant breeder’s identity.
Only the number of nest residents and brood development at
the time of treatment significantly affected brood development
at worker maturation (both effects positive; GLM, y ¼ date of
worker emergence; main effects: treatment: t ¼ 20.50, p ¼
0.78, dominance-usurpation: t ¼ 1.51, p ¼ 0.14, group size:
t ¼ 20.94, p ¼ 0.35, brood value at joining: t ¼ 21.69, p ¼
0.10; y ¼ brood value at worker emergence; main effects: treat-
ment: t ¼ 0.45, p ¼ 0.62, dominance-usurpation: t ¼ 0.79, p ¼
0.94, group size: t ¼ 3.59, p ¼ 0.0012, brood value at joining:
t ¼ 4.64, p, 0.001; n nests¼ 55).
(c) Behavioural interactions during joining events
New joiners did not spend more time foraging than estab-
lished subordinates, correcting for rank (GLMM; Gaussian
error; y ¼ time spent off the nest; main effects: joiner or sub-
ordinate: x2 ¼ 1.63, p ¼ 0.20, rank: x2 ¼ 95.57, p, 0.001).
However, new joiners brought back a higher total value of
foraging items than established subordinates, correcting for
time spent foraging. In other words, forage value per time
unit spent foraging was higher for recent joiners than for
established subordinates. The amount of aggression that a
joiner received also tended to be positively correlated with
foraging return values, while relatedness between the joiner
and the established nest residents had no effect on foraging
returns (GLMM; negative binomial error; y ¼ total foraging
return value; main effects: joiner or subordinate: z ¼ 2.73,
p ¼ 0.0063, aggression received: z ¼ 1.71, p ¼ 0.088, time
spent off the nest: z ¼ 1.75, p ¼ 0.080, average relatedness
between joiner and residents: z ¼ 21.47, p ¼ 0.14). Recent
joiners that later became the dominant breeders on their
nests worked less hard during video recordings than joiners
that remained subordinate (n ¼ 19; y ¼ foraging return
value per time unit; Wilcoxon’s W ¼ 8.5, p ¼ 0.043).
Joiners neither received nor initiated more aggression
than other nest residents, and average relatedness between
joiner and residents did not affect aggression levels
(GLMM; negative binomial error; y ¼ aggression received;
main effects: joiner or resident: z ¼ 1.41, p ¼ 0.16; number
of days after joining: z ¼ 20.20, p ¼ 0.84; relatedness between
joiner and residents: z ¼ 0.33, p ¼ 0.74; time spent on the nest:
z ¼ 3.52, p, 0.001; y ¼ aggression initiated; main effects:
joiner or resident: z ¼ 21.11, p ¼ 0.27, number of days after
joining: z ¼ 20.83, p ¼ 0.41, relatedness between joiner and
residents: z ¼ 0.22, p ¼ 0.82, time spent on the nest: initiated:
z ¼ 10.19, p, 0.001; n wasps ¼ 142, n nests ¼ 21).
(d) Established subordinates’ alternative options
Of 34 released subordinates, we relocated 18 (52.9%) on their
second nesting choices: 10 joined other established nests;
three initiated a new nest with each other; four joined nests
of unknown ages; and only a single subordinate nested
solitarily (taking over an abandoned nest). As with the
second-choice joiners, the second nesting choices of released
low-ranking subordinates were no different than their first
choices with regard to inheritance rank obtained and pres-
ence of sisters (ranks: Wilcoxon paired, V ¼ 63.5, p ¼ 0.22,
n ¼ 15; presence of sisters: x2 with Yates’s correction ¼ 0,
d.f. ¼ 1, p ¼ 1). Released subordinates also mainly chose
their new nests within a couple of metres (median ¼
1.30 m; mean ¼ 1.42 m; max ¼ 3.37 m).
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64. Discussion
(a) Joiners had high-payoff alternative options
We quantified the outside options available to cooperatively
breeding paper wasps, P. dominula, and found that at the
time of joining a nest, individuals had alternative options
that offered potentially high fitness payoffs. After we exper-
imentally removed their first nest choices, joiners’ second
nesting choices included a more than 1: 4 chance of obtaining
the dominant breeding position in a social group, which is
the highest payoff possible in this species. This means that
outside options offered much greater fitness payoffs than soli-
tary nesting: at our field site, the payoff from solitary nesting
is close to zero due to extremely high nest failure rates (more
than 90% of solitary nests fail [3,40,53]). This result shows
clearly that partner choice in P. dominula has the potential
to affect payoff distributions in models predicting the
amount of help provided by subordinates [7,21] or the
amount of reproduction that dominants might have to con-
cede to retain helpers [14,42,54]. Simply comparing payoffs
from observed helping decisions with those from a default
solitary breeding option, as is traditionally done, is likely to
greatly overestimate the relative benefit of staying and help-
ing in the current group. When high-quality outside
options exist, dominants may accept a lower subordinate
work effort than traditional models would predict. Hence,
we demonstrate that multiplayer models, such as those
offered by biological market theory, are more appropriate
than traditional models for understanding levels of help in
cooperative breeders such as P. dominula [7,9,21,22].
(b) First and second nest choices offered similar payoffs
Joiners and established subordinates did not necessarily have
to settle for inferior payoff options, compared with their first
nesting choice, when forced to make a second choice, con-
trary to our predictions. This result suggests that
individuals had more than one relatively high-quality
option available in the market. We found that direct fitness
returns associated with the chances of usurping or inheriting
the breeding position, as well as indirect fitness returns from
helping a related dominant, were no smaller in second
choices than in first nesting choices. We predicted that joiners
should evaluate their options and choose the one that offered
the highest fitness payoff [10,21,53]. However, joiners may
have insufficient information to make this choice: it is prob-
ably difficult for an individual to evaluate the exact chances
of obtaining the breeding position in all nests in the
market, prior to actually joining. Furthermore, there is little
evidence that females can discriminate relatedness at the indi-
vidual level in this species [39,44,55] and thereby
preferentially join relatives to maximize inclusive fitness.
Indeed, both joiners and subordinates sometimes chose to
join nests without sisters despite having sisters in nearby
nests. These results suggest that joiners chose one of several
options available to them, each offering relatively high pay-
offs, indicating that the biological market is large [22].
(c) Rejecting a joiner may be costly for dominant
breeders
Experimentally removed joiners could not easily be replaced
with new ones, suggesting that there is not an unlimited poolof potential joiners in the population (as was also found in
Polistes carolina [20]). Additionally, nest success increased with
the number of nest residents, substantiating previous findings
that larger groups fare better [3,40] and that it is in the interest
of dominants to accept joiners, particularly related ones, in
order to increase group size. Taken together, these results
suggest that, as we predicted, it may be costly for dominants
to reject joiners. Supporting this result, we found that original
dominantswere nomore likely to lose their dominant breeding
positions when joiners were allowed to stay, compared with
when joiners were removed. Hence, by accepting a joiner, an
original dominant does not necessarily incur a cost in terms of
an increased risk of nest usurpation, as she already faces a
risk of losing her breeding position to one of her established
subordinates. Allowing joiners to stay also did not generally
make established subordinates more likely to leave.
We thus propose that a dominant cannot afford to be too
‘choosy’ when presented with potential joiners: it is in her
interest to increase group size [3], so long as the risk of the
joiner usurping dominance is not too high. This potentially
makes joiners the ‘choosers’ in the market [10], so that domi-
nants are effectively competing with each other to attract a
limited supply of joiners. Dominants may therefore be pre-
pared to accept a reduced workload from subordinates in
order to retain them when competition for help increases in
the population [22].(d) Joiners may pay for group membership
Rather than using aggression, joiners may have used appease-
ment in the form of ‘pay to stay’ in order to become accepted in
their new nests. Within the first few days of joining, we found
that joiners provided higher-value forage than other subordi-
nates on their nests, perhaps to ‘pay’ for acceptance by the
group. Furthermore, joiners were not involved in a dispropor-
tionate number of aggressive interactions, contrary to what
would be expected if they were ‘forcing’ their acceptance as
new residents. These results render support for the hypothesis
that subordinates trade helping behaviour in return for group
membership [15]: when first arriving at a nest, a joiner may
need to prove her worth and convey she does not represent a
high risk of usurping the breeding position [15,32].
An alternative to the general idea that a joiner works in
exchange for group membership is that she works simply
because any investment in the nest would directly benefit
her if she later took over the dominant breeding position her-
self (‘group augmentation’ [56]). However, our findings do
not support the hypothesis that subordinates are maximizing
only group augmentation benefits, because joiners that later
became dominants worked less hard than those that
remained subordinate. This is consistent with previous find-
ings that group members higher up the hierarchy, and
therefore more likely to inherit the dominant position, in
fact work less hard than lower-ranked subordinates [45].(e) Sampling costs and prospecting
Given that experimentally presented foreign conspecifics are
normally attacked by nest residents [44], the lack of aggres-
sion towards new joiners suggests that residents may have
already been familiar with joiners, perhaps through previous
visits by joiners to establish familiarity via ‘prospecting
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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7behaviour’ [11,57]. Individuals in cooperative species may
benefit from maintaining a social network outside their cur-
rent groups by visiting and familiarizing themselves with
members of other groups. This prospecting behaviour can
provide them with information about whether between-
group dispersal would be beneficial, and can maximize
their chances of being accepted in the new group, should
they be expelled from their current group, choose to leave
or if their nest fails [11,57,58]. Indeed, nests fail at high
rates in P. dominula [3,40], and prospecting behaviour may
be common: we spotted 12.1% of marked wasps on at least
two different nests. This number is similar to previous studies
of the same population (approx. 16% in [40] and approx. 14%
in [22]).
However, prospecting behaviour is likely to be costly [59]
as visiting other groups requires time and energy that could
otherwise be spent foraging. These costs, called sampling
costs or searching costs in biological market terms [9,10],
are likely to limit the number of groups a subordinate wasp
can maintain in its social network. Second choice joiners
mainly chose options that were nearby. This may partly be
because nests containing genetic relatives tend to be nearby,
but greater costs of prospecting further afield could also con-
tribute. In a scenario where sampling costs are very high, for
example in a very low-density population where maintaining
peaceful relationships with distant neighbouring groups
would pose a high risk of predation or great energetic expen-
diture, market forces could fail to operate, as there might
effectively be no outside options available [10]. Hence, quan-
tifying sampling costs and documenting the actual social
networks that individuals gain through prospecting is an
important avenue for further studies in this system.5. Conclusion
(a) Invoking biological market models to include
outside options
Our key finding is that in a cooperatively breeding paper
wasp, P. dominula, both new joiners and established subordi-
nates have alternative nesting options that offer fitness
payoffs comparable with their first nest choices and that are
higher than the payoff through solitary nesting. The existence
of multiple options with similar payoffs has importantimplications for the conditions that subordinates should
accept in their groups; or in biological market terms, the
deal settled on between trading partners. For example,
high-quality outside options will affect the trade value of
helping behaviour and therefore influence how much help
subordinates are prepared to provide with rearing the domi-
nant’s offspring [22]. Outside options may also determine
whether subordinates should demand a share of the repro-
duction in return for their services in species where
reproductive concessions are likely to occur [23,60,61].
Hence, our findings clearly suggest that biological market
models are indeed necessary for understanding helping be-
haviour in P. dominula. This result is relevant for a wide
range of cooperatively breeding species where successful dis-
persal among groups occurs (for example cichlids [11],
carrion crows [62], dwarf mongooses [60], baboons [63]).
Unlike traditional models, which assume that a subordinate’s
only alternative is solitary breeding, market models allow for
partner choice, partner switching and competition for part-
ners [9,10]. To conclude, traditional cooperative theory and
reproductive skew models are therefore likely to overestimate
subordinates’ propensity to stay and help in their group,
overestimate the level of help that they provide, and perhaps
underestimate the level of reproductive concession the domi-
nant should offer her helpers. Future studies should identify
and quantify the alternative options available, and include
these in models predicting the rate of exchange of cooperative
behaviours within groups of cooperatively breeding species.
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